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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF GOLD CANYON SEWER COMPANY, AN ARIZONA CORPORATION, FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE OF ITS UTILITY PLANT AND PROPERTY AND FOR INCREASES IN ITS RATES

AND CHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICE

BASED THEREON.

DOCKET NO: SW-02519A-06-0015

GOLD CANYON SEWER COMPANY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO A.R.S. § 40-253

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

Arizona Corporation Commission

DOCKETED

DEC -5 2008

DOCKETED BY



FENNEMORE CRAIG PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

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I. INTRODUCTION.

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-253, Gold Canyon Sewer Company ("GCSC" or "the Company") petitions the Arizona Corporation Commission ("the Commission") for rehearing of Decision No. 70624 (November 24, 2008) ("the Rehearing Decision").

On August 1, 2007, the Commission granted application of the Residential Utility Consumer Office ("RUCO") for rehearing of Decision No. 69664 (June 28, 2007) ("the Original Decision") under A.R.S. § 40-253. The "two specific issues" raised in RUCO's rehearing application were that "(1) the Commission should have disallowed from rate base \$2.8 million to reflect what RUCO claims is excess capacity in Gold Canyon's wastewater treatment plant; and (2) the Commission should have adopted RUCO's hypothetical capital structure of 60% equity and 40% debt, rather than the actual 100% equity capital structure used by the Commission to calculate the Company's cost of capital." (Rehearing Decision at 3, Finding of Fact ("FOF") 2.)

Based on RUCO's request, and following three days of hearing and additional briefing, the Commission ultimately issued the Rehearing Decision. That decision modified the Original Decision in two specific ways:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Gold Canyon Sewer Company's rate base be reduced by \$1.0 million as discussed herein and that Gold Canyon Sewer Company submit by November 30, 2008, for Commission approval, rates and charges revised per this rate base reduction. These revised rates and charges will be applied on a prospective basis and will not be applied retroactively.

. . .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the weighted cost of capital approved in this case shall be 8.54 percent and that Gold Canyon Sewer Company submit by November 30, 2008, rates and charges revised per this cost of capital. These revised rates and charges will be applied on a prospective basis and will not be applied retroactively.

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(Rehearing Decision at 15-16.)

Unfortunately, both of these orders were unsupported by substantial evidence, and were arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful for the reasons explained herein. The Company also incorporates by reference its Rehearing Closing Brief, filed on May 5, 2008, and its Rehearing Reply Brief, filed on May 22, 2008, and the evidence and arguments set forth therein in support of this petition.

II. THE ISSUES ON WHICH REHEARING IS SOUGHT.

A. The Reduction of the Company's Rate Base by \$1 Million.

The Commission adopted RUCO's position that the Company's wastewater treatment plant has excess capacity and ordered that the Company's "rate base" be reduced by \$1 million. (Rehearing Decision at 15.) This reduction to the Company's rate base is unsupported by substantial evidence, and is arbitrary, capricious and otherwise unlawful for several reasons, including the following:

- 1. The Company does <u>not</u> have any excess wastewater treatment capacity. RUCO presented no credible engineering or operational evidence that the Company's wastewater treatment plant contained excess capacity. In fact, none of RUCO's witnesses were even qualified to express an opinion on the required capacity. RUCO instead had its rate analyst make a purely mathematical calculation and then argued for disallowance from rate base of that prorated portion of the plant value as excess capacity. RUCO's methodology is also flawed because it is based on <u>average</u>, rather than <u>peak</u>, wastewater flows. (Rehearing Decision at 4-5, FOF 5,6 and 8.) RUCO failed to present anything that constitutes substantial evidence. Therefore, RUCO failed to sustain its burden of proof that any portion of the Company's plant was not used and useful, and the resulting reduction to the Company's rate base is unlawful.
 - 2. GCSC designed and built the amount of wastewater treatment capacity

necessary to comply with the Commission's expectation that sewer utilities plan and build treatment capacity to serve customers over a five-year future planning horizon to ensure that safe and reliable service will be furnished. (Rehearing Decision at 4-5, FOF 7 and n 2.) Similarly, ADEQ requires that a sewer utility begin planning for additional treatment capacity when plant throughput reaches 80% of permitted capacity and begin constructing that additional capacity before 90% of permitted capacity throughput is reached. (*Ibid.*; *see also id.* at 8, FOF 16 and 17.) The Company's wastewater treatment plant was designed and built to comply with these regulatory requirements. This is supported by the Staff report and Staff expert witness testimony. Therefore, none of this capacity is "excess capacity."

3. The arbitrary reduction to rate base is in part based on the inclusion of information that could <u>not</u> have been known to GCSC at the time it had to plan for the renovation and expansion of the treatment plant, or at the time the plant was constructed, or even well after the construction was completed. Indeed, RUCO's accounting witness acknowledged that the Company's decision to renovate and expand its treatment plant was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances known in the 2004 - 2005 time frame decisions had to be made. (Rehearing Decision at 4, FOF 6.) For example, RUCO's witness stated:

We commend the Company for its proactive approach to eliminating the odor and noise and the customer problems with the undercapacity of existing plant when they took it over.

(Hearing Transcript at 943. See also id. at 957-58, 962-63, 988.)

Despite this testimony, the Commission has now second-guessed GCSC based on information that was not known to the Company, and that could not have been known to the Company, when it was obliged to design and construct its plant renovation and expansion. For example, in February 2005, GCSC experienced peak flows of almost 1.2

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million gallons per day ("gpd"), 80% of its minimum necessary capacity of 1.5 million gpd. (Rehearing Decision at 4, FOF 7; see also id. at 8, FOF 17.) Furthermore, based on growth projections at that time, Staff's engineering witness estimated that GCSC was likely to have peak flows in excess of 1.5 million gpd in 2007. (*Ibid.*) As such, GCSC would have been obligated to have capacity substantially greater than 1.5 million gpd in place by then or already be re-engaged in constructing additional capacity to meet ADEQ's expectations and the Commission's required 5-year forward planning horizon. The Commission's rules require that plant investment decisions be evaluated based on information that was known or should have been known at the time plant investment decisions had to be made. A.A.C. R14-2-103(A)(3)(1). Here, the Commission has ignored its own rules, and arbitrarily reduced GCSC's rate base by \$1 million just because reasonably anticipated growth failed to occur several years after a prudent amount of capacity was constructed. This was unlawful.

4. Even if the Commission's rules and the lack of evidence in the record of "excess capacity" are ignored, the Commission's rate base adjustment is substantially overstated. First, the Commission removed \$1 million from the Company's <u>rate base</u>. The issue is whether the Company's <u>plant in service</u> contained excess capacity. RUCO's own recommendation was for a roughly \$2.8 million plant adjustment that, with necessary conforming plant adjustments (i.e., deferred income taxes, depreciation), only reduced RUCO's recommended rate base by approximately \$1.8 million.

Additionally, as stated, there was no dispute that in early 2005, peak flows approached 1.2 million gpd and, therefore, that a minimum of 1.5 million gpd of treatment capacity was needed to ensure safe and reliable service. (Rehearing Decision at 4-5, FOF 7; *id.* at 8, FOF 17.) At most, therefore, the cost of the additional 400,000 gpd of treatment capacity (i.e., building a plant with a capacity of 1.9 million gpd rather than 1.5 million gpd) was potentially subject to disallowance, as the Commission has

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acknowledged. (Rehearing Decision at 8, FOF 17.) Moreover, there is no dispute that the incremental cost of adding 400,000 gpd of capacity was <u>less</u> than \$1 million. (Rehearing Decision at 4-5, FOF 7 and n. 3; *id.* at 8, FOF 17.) One of the Commissioners acknowledged during the Open Meeting that the order was faulty and had no basis in fact.

So, approximately, approximately a million dollars isn't a million dollars. It is some other number; we just don't know what it is.

This is a faulty, it is a faulty order. The only reason we are doing it is to lower the rates somehow and find a way to do it. It is not, we are not using any real math here or any kind of real process. We are just trying to drive the rates down.

Transcript from November 13, 2008 Open Meeting ("OM Tr.") at 221.

In the final analysis, the Commission has adopted a flawed methodology contrary to its own rules and penalized the Company for acting prudently to ensure that safe and adequate treatment capacity is available at a reasonable cost.

B. The Use of 8.54 Percent as the Rate of Return Is Arbitrary and Unlawful.

In addition to arbitrarily reducing GCSC's rate base by \$1 million, the Commission ordered that the Company's return on rate base be reduced to 8.54 percent. (Rehearing Decision at 16.) This return was derived by adopting RUCO's recommended return on equity of 8.6 percent, RUCO's recommended cost of debt of 8.45 percent, and RUCO's hypothetical capital structure of 40% debt and 60% equity. The order to utilize a weighted average cost of capital of 8.54 percent is unsupported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful for several reasons, including the following:

1. RUCO did <u>not</u> seek rehearing on the return on equity. RUCO's rehearing application made no mention of its recommended return of 8.6% and did not ask that the

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Commission adopt a different return on equity than that adopted in the Original Decision. (See, e.g., Rehearing Decision at 3.) Thus, adoption of RUCO's return on equity of 8.6 percent violates A.R.S. § 40-253. This statute requires that an application for rehearing "set forth specifically the grounds on which it is based." A.R.S. § 40-253(C) (emphasis supplied).

- In the Original Decision, the Commission provided a detailed discussion of 2. the basis for adopting Staff's recommended cost of equity of 9.2%. The Commission explained, for example, that the "[publicly traded] companies in Staff's sample group are appropriate because they have objective data that is publicly available through Value Line and other investor publications." (Original Decision at 28.) RUCO used a different sample group in its cost of equity estimate. Similarly, the Commission explained that "Staff's expert witness relied on a constant growth DCF model, a two-stage DCF model, and a two-part CAPM analysis for calculating his cost of equity capital, consistent with a long-line of prior Commission decisions that have adopted comparable methodologies for determining cost of capital." (Id. at 29.) RUCO used much different versions of the models. In fact, RUCO never challenged Staff's recommended return on equity of 9.2% or questioned the methods used by Staff to derive that return, as evidenced by the discussion in the Rehearing Decision. (Rehearing Decision at 9-11, FOF 20-23.) The Rehearing Decision fails to explain why RUCO's models and their inputs, as well as RUCO's sample group of publicly traded companies, are superior to those that have been consistently approved "in a long line of prior Commission decisions" and should be used in this case. This is arbitrary and unlawful.
- 3. RUCO's recommended cost of debt was a fiction. There is no record of testimony or discussion in this case as to the availability of or the cost of debt for utilities of this size and type. No evidence was presented to show that GCSC could borrow more than \$6 million at the cost of debt imputed in this decision or at any other cost. This sort

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of fictitious ratemaking is not supported by substantial evidence and is arbitrary and capricious.

- 4. RUCO's recommended hypothetical capital structure is a fiction supported by the Commission. The Company's actual capital structure is 100% equity, and in the Original Decision, consistent with well-established practice, the Commission approved a downward adjustment of 100 basis points to the cost of equity to account for the assumed lower financial risk associated with a 100% equity capital structure. This adjustment was deemed appropriate and sufficient to yield a fair and reasonable return to the Company based on its 100% equity capital structure. The use of a hypothetical capital structure may be another means of accounting for the level of financial risk the utility faces, but the use of the associated fictitious assumptions and adjustments that could accompany it (and lower the Company's revenue requirement) is without substantial evidence, and is arbitrary and capricious.
- 5. The Rehearing Decision conflicts with *Black Mountain Sewer Corp.*, Decision No. 69164 (Dec. 5, 2006). The GCSC and Black Mountain rate cases involve virtually identical circumstances and were decided by the Commission within eight months of each other. In fact, Black Mountain's application for rate increases was filed on September 16, 2005, while GCSC's application for rate increases was filed on January 13, 2006, only four months later. Decision No. 69164 at 1; Rehearing Decision at 1. The common stock of both sewer utilities was acquired by Algonquin Water Resources of America in 2001. (Decision No. 69164 at 2; Original Decision at 1-2.) The service territories of both sewer utilities are on the outskirts of the Phoenix metropolitan area, and are approximately 30 miles apart. (Decision No. 69164 at 1.) Finally, and most importantly, for ratemaking purposes both sewer utilities have capital structures consisting of 100 percent equity and no debt. Decision No. 69164 at 19; Decision at 24. In other words, GCSC and Black Mountain are two truly comparable utilities that had

applications for rate increases pending before the Commission at the same time.

In Black Mountain's case, Black Mountain and Staff recommended the use of the sewer utility's 100% equity capital structure, while RUCO proposed a hypothetical capital structure containing 57 percent equity and 43 percent debt. (Decision No. 69164 at 19.) The Commission rejected RUCO's proposed hypothetical capital structure, concluding that a capital structure comprised of 100 percent equity should be used in calculating Black Mountain's cost of equity. The Commission stated: "We believe RUCO's hypothetical capital structure recommendation is results oriented and is not consistent with the Company's actual capital structure." (Decision No. 69164 at 20.)

Instead, the Commission adopted Staff's recommended capital structure, containing 100 percent equity, as well as Staff's 9.6 percent return on equity and Staff's 9.6 percent return on rate base. (*Id.* at 26-27.) The Commission expressly determined "that adoption of Staff's recommendation results in a just and reasonable return for [Black Mountain]," and further found that a "rate of return on [rate base] of 9.60 percent based on a capital structure of 100 percent common equity is reasonable and appropriate." (*Id.* at 27, 39.)

The findings in that proceeding should be controlling in GCSC's case. There is nothing that distinguishes Black Mountain from GCSC. Both utilities are small sewer utilities owned by the same parent and provide similar services in same general area. The plant owned by both utilities and used to furnish service is financed entirely by equity with no debt in the balance sheet. In Black Mountain, RUCO's hypothetical capital structure was rejected as "results oriented," and RUCO did not challenge that finding. Therefore, given the close similarity between the two sewer utilities and the fact that the two cases substantially overlapped, the Commission's adoption of a hypothetical capital structure for GCSC is arbitrary and capricious. Its adoption in this instance is blatantly "results oriented" and was rejected by the Commission in the Black Mountain case for

precisely that very same reason.

C. Other Issues Raised For Rehearing.

- 1. As stated, RUCO sought rehearing of the Original Decision pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-253. This statute requires that the "application set forth specifically the grounds on which it is based." A.R.S. § 40-253(C). As the Commission correctly states in the Rehearing Decision, RUCO raised two specific issues in its application–excess capacity and hypothetical capital structure. Nevertheless, two Commissioners voting to approve the rate reductions approved in the Rehearing Decision specifically justified their votes on odor issues that the Commission previously determined were resolved and on statements made by the Company's past President. (See OM Tr. at 107-111, 160-163, and 168.) Both of these issues were addressed in detail and subject to specific findings of fact and final resolution in the Original Decision. (Original Decision at 30-35 (odor issues), 36-42 (prior statements by Mr. Hill) and FOF 41 and 42.) Moreover, these issues were not raised in RUCO's rehearing application, and cannot be reheard or otherwise used as a basis to lower the Company's revenue requirement. Therefore, the Commission violated A.R.S. § 40-253.
- 2. The Rehearing Decision rejected GCSC's request to recover \$90,000 of additional rate case expense for the rehearing. The Commission concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of this expense. (Rehearing Decision at 14-15, FOF 34-37.) However, the Company presented evidence showing that it had incurred more than the \$90,000 requested. (E.g., Rh. Tr. at 494-495, 502-503) Staff supported recovery of at least \$73,000 in rehearing rate case expense. (Rh. Tr. at 495-496.) The Rehearing Decision, however, erroneously states that Staff declined to recommend recovery of rehearing rate case expense. (Rehearing Decision at 14-15, FOF 36.) RUCO took no position. (*Id.*) Accordingly, the denial of rate case expense for a proceeding in

which GCSC was forced to participate by the Commission is contrary to the evidence in the record, and is arbitrary and capricious.

3. The modification of the Company's revenue requirement as adopted in the Original Decision was, by the Commissioners' own admission, simply an effort to reduce GCSC's revenues through any means possible. *See*, *e.g.*, OM Tr. at 17, 111, 219-220, and 221. Such results-oriented ratemaking is unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because it does not result in an opportunity to earn a fair return on rate base and does not result in just and reasonable rates.

III. CONCLUSION.

For these reasons, the Commission should rehear this matter and issue a new order consistent with the foregoing and the evidence in the record.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of December, 2008.

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

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| 10 | to the following. |
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